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| Film poster for "Jiawudahaizhan" (2012) which examines the First Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5 |
This coming August marks the 120th anniversary of
the First Sino-Japan war that broke out in the summer of 1894 and was largely
fought at sea, much to China’s detriment. Japan’s newly revamped and modernized
navy made quick work of the out-of-date and moribund Qing Dynasty naval forces
and in doing so changed the course of history.
The fighting was fierce but brief and within a year
Japan’s stunning victory had radically altered the political map, not to mention
the fate and fortunes of millions, for decades to come. Korea, which had long
been a vassal state of China, fell under the boot of Japanese control, while
the Chinese province of Taiwan and associated islands were ceded to Japan in
the lopsided peace settlement of Shimonoseki, a peace without honor that
deprived the China of both vital land and immense treasure.
In 1911 Chinese republicans overthrew the corrupt Qing
dynasty, but years of feudal misrule had left China unable to stop the
predations of outside powers. In response to collapse, anarchy and decay, two
major projects of national self-strengthening were underway, one led by Mao
Zedong, mostly in rural areas; the other led by Chiang Kai-shek in the cities.
They shared a goal of a strong, united China when they weren’t trying to kill
each other, like two tigers seeking to dominate the same mountain.
Meanwhile, Japan continued to modernize and
industrialize, its resource base vastly enriched due to the spoils of
Shimonoseki. In addition to colonial control of Taiwan and Korea, and many a
strategic islet in between, Japan used stealth and outright audacity to gain an
intimidating military position on the Chinese mainland. Using Korea and coastal
ports as a springboard, Manchuria was decimated and reconfigured to serve as a
Japanese hinterland.
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Japanese kimono print commemorates Sino-Japanese War (from Hawaii Star-Bulletin)
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The Second Sino-Japanese war can be dated to 1931 when
Japan launched its colonial invasion of Manchuria. Tensions simmered for six
more years because the Nanjing government, under the iron-fisted control of KMT
leader Chiang Kai-shek, did not consider it advantageous to confront Japan
directly. But patriotic resistance mounted and by 1937 it took
only a small skirmish on the Marco Polo Bridge on the outskirts of Beijing for
all-out war to break loose.
The death and destruction that followed shook Asia to
its foundations and is still passionately argued about today.
This year marks the 100th anniversary of the
outbreak of World War I, and there has been pointed commentary to the effect
that the lessons of that war, largely a European internal affair, somehow apply
to the rising tensions between China and Japan today.
There may be indeed by uncanny parallels, for war is
always folly and common sense is a predictable casualty as two sides square
off, but it is the Sino-Japanese wars that are most relevant to the discussion.
As American wit Mark Twain liked to point out, history doesn’t necessarily
repeat but it sure does like to rhyme.
So what tragic echoes from the past and what sympathetic
vibrations might help China and Japan avoid a face-off while trying to preserve
face?
-Wars are rooted in miscalculation, each side trying to
make the other blink first on the way to a rapid, total victory.
-Both Sino-Japanese wars started small and limited in
scope; a clash at sea, a skirmish on a bridge. But a multiplier effect sets in
once blood is drawn and things can quickly unravel out of control.
-Diplomatic
negotiations tend to founder, and in effect become an expression of war by
other means, if over-confidence and intransigence results in ultimatums rather
than genuine mutual accommodation.
-Each side tends to over-estimate its own ability, while
underestimating its rival.
-Korea’s thorny domestic politics have ensnared its
neighbors, but it is also gets pitifully caught in the crossfire between them.
Seen alternately as a dagger pointed at Japan or a springboard to invade the
mainland, the Korean peninsula can become a proxy battlefront between the two.
-The infrastructure of Manchuria, train lines in particular,
were key factors in both wars.
-Naval power is a strategic necessity for resource-poor
Japan, while China's vast hinterland is its greatest strategic strength.
-Securing an alliance with a prevailing Atlantic power,
such as Japan did with the UK the first time around, or with the US, as China
did the second time around, can thwart one’s rival and alter the outcome.
-Small islands can assume strategic importance of
asymmetrical proportions, influencing the fate of millions. In the first
Sino-Japanese war, control of the Penghu Islands gave Tokyo a chokehold by
which to exact control of Taiwan. The key battles of Japan’s Pacific war are
like a roll call of otherwise obscure islands. Midway, Guam, Saipan,
Guadalcanal, Iwo Jima and, of course, Okinawa. Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor,
itself an island outpost, was launched from the remote Kurile Islands.
-The Diaoyu/Senkaku islets, though not specifically
stipulated as Japanese spoils in the treaty of Shimonoseki, fell under de facto
control of Japan-administered Taiwan after 1895, and then later came under the
benign neglect of American administration with the capitulation of Japan in
1945. The islets were of no importance in either war.
-Russia is in a geo-strategic position to benefit from
any vacuum created by conflict between China and Japan. In both first and
second wars, Russia made significant inroads into Manchuria as the Japanese
threat receded.
-When China and Japan clash, the entire Asia-Pacific is
shaken to its foundation. As the anniversary of the first Sino-Japanese war
approaches, it is a good time to recall the lost live and unforgivably high
cost of trading diplomacy and trade for armed raids and warfare.
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| Japan's victory in 1895 paved way to seize Manchuria but led to defeat in 1945 |
